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020 _a9789400751736
_9978-94-007-5173-6
024 7 _a10.1007/978-94-007-5173-6
_2doi
050 4 _aB53
072 7 _aHPM
_2bicssc
072 7 _aPHI015000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a128.2
_223
100 1 _aIrvine, Elizabeth.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aConsciousness as a Scientific Concept
_h[electronic resource] :
_bA Philosophy of Science Perspective /
_cby Elizabeth Irvine.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2013.
300 _aXI, 182 p. 6 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aStudies in Brain and Mind ;
_v5
505 0 _a1. Introduction: The Science of Consciousness -- 2. Subjective Measures of Consciousness -- 3. Measures of Consciousness and the Method of Qualitative Differences -- 4. Dissociations and Consciousness -- 5. Converging on Consciousness -- 6. Mechanisms of Consciousness and Scientific Kinds -- 7. Content-Matching: The case of Sensory memory and phenomenal consciousness -- 8. Content-Matching: The contents of what? -- 9. Scientific Eliminativism: Why there can be no Science of Consciousness -- 10. Conclusion -- Appendix: Dice Game.-.
520 _aThe source of endless speculation and public curiosity, our scientific quest for the origins of human consciousness has expanded along with the technical capabilities of science itself and remains one of the key topics able to fire public as much as academic interest. Yet many problematic issues, identified in this important new book, remain unresolved. Focusing on a series of methodological difficulties swirling around consciousness research, the contributors to this volume suggest that ‘consciousness’ is, in fact, not a wholly viable scientific concept.  Supporting this ‘eliminativist‘ stance are assessments of the current theories and methods of consciousness science in their own terms, as well as applications of good scientific practice criteria from the philosophy of science. For example, the work identifies the central problem of the misuse of qualitative difference and dissociation paradigms, often deployed to identify measures of consciousness. It also examines the difficulties that attend the wide range of experimental protocols used to operationalise consciousness—and the implications this has on the findings of integrative approaches across behavioural and neurophysiological research. The work also explores the significant mismatch between the common intuitions about the content of consciousness, that motivate much of the current science, and the actual properties of the neural processes underlying sensory and cognitive phenomena. Even as it makes the negative eliminativist case, the strong empirical grounding in this volume also allows positive characterisations to be made about the products of the current science of consciousness, facilitating a re-identification of target phenomena and valid research questions for the mind sciences.
650 0 _aPhilosophy (General).
650 0 _aPhilosophy of mind.
650 0 _aScience
_xPhilosophy.
650 0 _aPsychological tests and testing.
650 1 4 _aPhilosophy.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Mind.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Science.
650 2 4 _aPsychological Methods/Evaluation.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9789400751729
830 0 _aStudies in Brain and Mind ;
_v5
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5173-6
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
999 _c99554
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