000			03500nam a22004455i 4500
001			978-94-007-2187-6
003			DE-He213
005			20140220082932.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			120914s2013 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9789400721876 _9978-94-007-2187-6
024	7		_a10.1007/978-94-007-2187-6 _2doi
050		4	_aB108-5802
072		7	_aHPC _2bicssc
072		7	_aPHI009000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a180-190 _223
100	1		_aRocknak, Stefanie. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aImagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects _h[electronic resource] / _cby Stefanie Rocknak.
264		1	_aDordrecht : _bSpringer Netherlands : _bImprint: Springer, _c2013.
300			_aXVI, 289 p. 10 illus. _bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
490	1		_aThe New Synthese Historical Library ; _v71
505	0		_aGeneral Introduction.- PART I: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK.- 1. Four Distinctions.- 2. Elementary Belief, Causally-Produced Belief and the Natural Relation of Causality -- 3. The Two Systems of Reality -- PART II: PERFECT IDENTITY AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL IMAGINATION -- 4. Proto-Objects -- 5. The First Account of Transcendental Perfect Identity: The Foundation of Secret Causes -- 6. A Mysterious Kind of Causation: The Second Account of Transcendental Perfect Identity -- 7. Unity, Number and Time: The Third Account of Transcendental Perfect Identity.- PART III: IMAGINING CAUSES IN REACTION TO THE VULGAR: A PURELY PHILOSOPHICAL ENDEAVOR -- 8. The Vulgar Attempt to Achieve Perfect Identity -- 9. The Philosopher’s Reaction to the Vulgar: Imagined Causes Revisited -- 10. Personal Identity.- PART IV: JUSTIFICATION -- 11. Three Unjustified Instances of Imagined Causes: Substances, Primary Qualities and the Soul as an Immaterial Object -- 12. Conclusion.- Bibliography -- Index.
520			_aThis book provides the first comprehensive account of Hume’s conception of objects in Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature. What, according to Hume, are objects? Ideas? Impressions? Mind-independent objects? All three? None of the above? Through a close textual analysis, Rocknak shows that Hume thought that objects are imagined ideas. But, she argues, he struggled with two accounts of how and when we imagine such ideas. On the one hand, Hume believed that we always and universally imagine that objects are the causes of our perceptions. On the other hand, he thought that we only imagine such causes when we reach a “philosophical” level of thought. This tension manifests itself in Hume’s account of personal identity; a tension that, Rocknak argues, Hume acknowledges in the Appendix to the Treatise. As a result of Rocknak’s detailed account of Hume’s conception of objects, we are forced to accommodate new interpretations of, at least, Hume’s notions of belief, personal identity, justification and causality.
650		0	_aPhilosophy (General).
650		0	_aPhilosophy, modern.
650	1	4	_aPhilosophy.
650	2	4	_aHistory of Philosophy.
650	2	4	_aModern Philosophy.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9789400721869
830		0	_aThe New Synthese Historical Library ; _v71
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2187-6
912			_aZDB-2-SHU
999			_c99362 _d99362