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020 _a9781447147275
_9978-1-4471-4727-5
024 7 _a10.1007/978-1-4471-4727-5
_2doi
050 4 _aHD9502-9502.5
072 7 _aTHRB
_2bicssc
072 7 _aKNB
_2bicssc
072 7 _aBUS070040
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a333.79
_223
100 1 _aGullì, Francesco.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aPollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets
_h[electronic resource] /
_cby Francesco Gullì.
264 1 _aLondon :
_bSpringer London :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2013.
300 _aVIII, 116 p. 21 illus.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aLecture Notes in Energy,
_x2195-1284 ;
_v6
505 0 _a1.Introduction and Summary -- 2. Pollution under Hybrid Environmental Regulation: the Case of Space Heating -- 3. Pollution under Environmental Regulation within Multi-period Auctions: the Case of Electricity Markets -- 4. Pollution under Imperfect Competition in Vertical Related Energy Markets.
520 _aPollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets provides a study of environmental regulation when energy markets are imperfectly competitive. This theoretical treatment focuses on three relevant cases of energy markets. First, the residential space heating sector where hybrid regulation such as taxation and emissions trading together are possible. Second, the electricity market where transactions are organized in the form of multi-period auctions. Third, namely natural gas (input) and electricity (output) markets where there is combined imperfect competition in vertical related energy markets.   The development of free or low carbon technologies supported by energy policies, aiming at increasing security of supply, is also explored whilst considering competition policies that reduce market power in energy markets thus improving market efficiency. Pollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets discusses the key issues of whether imperfect competition can lessen the ability of environmental policy to reduce pollution and/or to minimize the cost of meeting environmental targets.   Policymakers, analysts and researchers gain a thorough understanding of the performance of environmental policy from Pollution Under Environmental Regulation in Energy Markets leading to better design of simulation models of performance and costs of environmental regulation.
650 0 _aEngineering.
650 0 _aEngineering economy.
650 0 _aEnvironmental economics.
650 1 4 _aEngineering.
650 2 4 _aEnergy Economics.
650 2 4 _aEnvironmental Economics.
650 2 4 _aEnergy Policy, Economics and Management.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9781447147268
830 0 _aLecture Notes in Energy,
_x2195-1284 ;
_v6
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4471-4727-5
912 _aZDB-2-PHA
999 _c94683
_d94683