000 03971nam a22004935i 4500
001 978-3-319-03488-1
003 DE-He213
005 20140220082513.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 140107s2014 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783319034881
_9978-3-319-03488-1
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-319-03488-1
_2doi
050 4 _aKZA1002-5205
050 4 _aKZD1002-6715
072 7 _aLBB
_2bicssc
072 7 _aLAW051000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a341.4
_223
082 0 4 _a341
_223
100 1 _aMasum Billah, Muhammad.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aEffects of Insurance on Maritime Liability Law
_h[electronic resource] :
_bA Legal and Economic Analysis /
_cby Muhammad Masum Billah.
264 1 _aCham :
_bSpringer International Publishing :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2014.
300 _aXV, 210 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
505 0 _a1. Introduction -- 2. Lack of Insurance and Its Effect on Maritime Liability Law: A Historical Evaluation -- 3. Insurance and Limitation of Ship owners’ Liability: An Economic Analysis -- 4. Insurance through General Average: Its Justifications and Effects on Optimal Care and on Social Costs -- 5. Maritime Cargo Liability Regimes in Light of Insurance Realities -- 6. Role of Insurance in Providing Adequate Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage and in Reducing Oil Pollution Incidents -- 7. Incentive Effect of Liability Rules in the Presence of Liability Insurance -- 8. Conclusion.
520 _aThe book examines how the absence of insurance in the past led to some special maritime liability law principles such as ‘general average’ (i.e., losses or expenses shared by all the parties to a maritime adventure) and the limitation of shipowners’ liability. In the absence of insurance, these principles served the function of insurance mostly for shipowners. As commercial marine insurance is now widely available, these principles have lost their justification and may in fact interfere with the most important goal of liability law i.e., deterrence from negligence. The work thus recommends their abolition. It further argues that when insurance is easily available and affordable to the both parties to a liability claim, the main goal of liability law should be deterrence as opposed to compensation. This is exactly the case with the maritime cargo liability claims where both cargo owners and shipowners are invariably insured. As a result, the sole focus of cargo liability law should be and to a great extent, is deterrence. On the other hand, in the vessel-source oil pollution liability setting, pollution victims are not usually insured. Therefore, oil pollution liability law has to cater both for compensation and deterrence, the two traditional goals of liability law. The final question the work addresses is whether the deterrent effect of liability law is affected by the availability of liability insurance. Contrary to the popular belief the work attempts to prove that the presence of liability insurance is not necessarily a hindrance but can be a complementary force towards the realization of deterrent goal of liability law.
650 0 _aLaw.
650 0 _aEnvironmental pollution.
650 1 4 _aLaw.
650 2 4 _aLaw of the Sea, Air and Outer Space.
650 2 4 _aInsurance.
650 2 4 _aInternational Environmental Law.
650 2 4 _aInternational Economic Law, Trade Law.
650 2 4 _aTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History.
650 2 4 _aWaste Water Technology / Water Pollution Control / Water Management / Aquatic Pollution.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783319034874
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03488-1
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
999 _c92997
_d92997