000			03667nam a22004335i 4500
001			978-3-319-02285-7
003			DE-He213
005			20140220082510.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			131118s2014 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783319022857 _9978-3-319-02285-7
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-319-02285-7 _2doi
050		4	_aBJ1-1725
072		7	_aHPQ _2bicssc
072		7	_aPHI005000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a170 _223
100	1		_aPetro, Stephen. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aRationality, Virtue, and Liberation _h[electronic resource] : _bA Post-Dialectical Theory of Value / _cby Stephen Petro.
264		1	_aCham : _bSpringer International Publishing : _bImprint: Springer, _c2014.
300			_aXIII, 327 p. 6 illus. _bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
490	1		_aLibrary of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, _x1387-6678 ; _v33
505	0		_aIntroduction -- Chapter I: Rethinking Rationality; 1.1 The Reconciliation of Ethical Rationalism, Ethical Naturalism, Virtue Ethics, and the Biological and Social Sciences; 1.2: The Failure of Axiological Anti-Foundationalism; 1.3: The Concept of Rationality: Toward a Universal Model -- Chapter II: Rationality and Dialectical Necessity; 2.1: Prescription, Preference, and Dialectical Contingence; 2.2: Developing a Method of Justification; 2.3: A Sound Positive Account, Part I: An Analysis of Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism; 2.4: A Sound Positive Account, Part II: An Analysis of Habermas's Discourse Ethics -- Chapter III: The Dialectical Structure of Value Judgments; 3.1: The Dialectical Structure of "Ought" and "Must"; 3.2: The Dialectical Structure of Rights and Duties -- Chapter IV: Rationality, Virtue, and the Search for Intrinsic Goodness; 4.1: Magnell's Challenge; 4.2: Problems in Searle's Epistemology of Function; 4.3: The Life Framework: The Significance of Foot's Virtue Theory Chapter V: Beyond Dialectical Necessity: Assertoric Necessity and the Grammar of Goodness; 5.1: Reflexive Intrinsicality & The Teleologically Comparative Tendential Necessity of Functions; 5.2: The Summum -- Bonum Conclusion.
520			_aThis book explores the overlooked but vital theoretical relationships between R. M. Hare, Alan Gewirth, and Jürgen Habermas. The author claims their accounts of value, while failing to address classic virtue-theoretical critiques, bear the seeds of a resolution to the ultimate question “What is most valuable?” These dialectical approaches, as claimed, justify a reinterpretation of value and value judgment according to the Carnapian conception of an empirical-linguistic framework or grammar. Through a further synthesis with the work of Philippa Foot and Thomas Magnell, the author shows that “value” would be literally meaningless without four fundamental phenomena which constitute such a framework: Logical Judgment, Conceptual Synthesis, Conceptual Abstraction, and Freedom. As part of the 'grammar of goodness,' the excellence of these phenomena, in a highly concrete way, constitute the essence of the greatest good, as this book explains.
650		0	_aPhilosophy (General).
650		0	_aEthics.
650	1	4	_aPhilosophy.
650	2	4	_aEthics.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783319022840
830		0	_aLibrary of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, _x1387-6678 ; _v33
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-02285-7
912			_aZDB-2-SHU
999			_c92835 _d92835