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001 978-90-481-8770-6
003 DE-He213
005 20140220084601.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100427s2010 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9789048187706
_9978-90-481-8770-6
024 7 _a10.1007/978-90-481-8770-6
_2doi
050 4 _aB65
072 7 _aLAB
_2bicssc
072 7 _aPHI021000
_2bisacsh
072 7 _aLAW000000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a340.1
_223
100 1 _aSánchez Brigido, Rodrigo Eduardo.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aGroups, Rules and Legal Practice
_h[electronic resource] /
_cby Rodrigo Eduardo Sánchez Brigido.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands,
_c2010.
300 _aXXV, 220p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aLaw and Philosophy Library,
_x1572-4395 ;
_v89
505 0 _aThree Tests -- Accounts Based on the Idea of a Social Rule (I): Hart’s Account and the Coordinative-Convention Approach -- Accounts Based on the Idea of a Social Rule (II): Raz’s Account -- Collective Intentional Activities: Shapiro’s Model -- Kutz on Collective Intentional Activities. Building an Alternative Model: Groups Which Act with No Normative Unity -- The Activities of Groups with a Normative Unity of Type (I). Non-developed Instances of Legal Practice -- Gilbert’s Account of Collective Activities -- On Agreements -- The Activities of Groups with a Normative Unity of Type II. Other-Regarding, Developed Institutions. Developed Instances of the Judiciary -- Developed Instances of Legal Practice. Meeting the Tests.
520 _aEver since Hart´s The Concept of Law, legal philosophers agree that the practice of law-applying officials is a fundamental aspect of law. Yet there is a huge disagreement on the nature of this practice. Is it a conventional practice? Is it like the practice that takes place, more generally, when there is a social rule in a group? Does it share the nature of collective intentional action? The book explores the main responses to these questions, and claims that they fail on two main counts: current theories do not explain officials´ beliefs that they are under a duty qua members of an institution, and they do not explain officials´ disagreement about the content of these institutional duties. Based on a particular theory of collective action, the author elaborates then an account of certain institutions, and claims that the practice is an institutional practice of sorts. This would explain officials´ beliefs in institutional duties, and officials´ disagreement about those duties. The book should be of interest to legal philosophers, but also to those concerned with group and social action theories and, more generally, with the nature of institutions.
650 0 _aPhilosophy (General).
650 0 _aEthics.
650 0 _aPhilosophy of law.
650 0 _aLaw
_xPhilosophy.
650 0 _aDemography.
650 1 4 _aPhilosophy.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Law.
650 2 4 _aDemography.
650 2 4 _aEthics.
650 2 4 _aLaw Theory/Law Philosophy.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9789048187690
830 0 _aLaw and Philosophy Library,
_x1572-4395 ;
_v89
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8770-6
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
999 _c113540
_d113540