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020 _a9789048133390
_9978-90-481-3339-0
024 7 _a10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0
_2doi
050 4 _aBJ1-1725
072 7 _aHPQ
_2bicssc
072 7 _aPHI005000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a170
_223
100 1 _aJoyce, Richard.
_eeditor.
245 1 2 _aA World Without Values
_h[electronic resource] :
_bEssays on John Mackie's Moral Error Theory /
_cedited by Richard Joyce, Simon Kirchin.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands,
_c2010.
300 _aXXIV, 238p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aPhilosophical Studies Series ;
_v114
505 0 _aAgainst Ethics -- Nihilism, Nietzsche, and the Doppelganger Problem -- Patterns of Objectification -- Mackie's Internalisms -- Mackie's Realism: Queer Pigs and the Web of Belief -- Mackie on Practical Reason -- The Argument from Moral Experience -- Beyond the Error Theory -- Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness -- A Tension in the Moral Error Theory -- Business as Usual? The Error Theory, Internalism, and the Function of Morality -- The Fictionalist's Attitude Problem -- Abolishing Morality.
520 _aFor centuries, certain moral philosophers have maintained that morality is an illusion, comparable to talking of ghosts or unicorns. These moral skeptics claim that the world simply doesn’t contain the sort of properties (such as moral badness, moral obligation, etc.) necessary to render moral statements true. Even seemingly obvious moral claims, such as "killing innocents is morally wrong" fail to be true. What would lead someone to adopt such a radical viewpoint? Are the arguments in its favor defensible or plausible? What impact would embracing such a view have on one’s practical life? Taking as its point of departure the work of moral philosopher John Mackie (1917-1981), A World Without Values is a collection of essays on moral skepticism by leading contemporary philosophers, some of whom are sympathetic to Mackie’s views, some of whom are opposed. Rather than treating moral skepticism as something to dismiss as quickly as possible, this anthology is a comprehensive exploration of the topic, and as such will be a valuable resource for students of moral philosophy at all levels, as well as professionals in the field of meta-ethics. A World Without Values presents state-of-the-art arguments that advance the ongoing philosophical debate on several fronts, and will enjoy an important place on any meta-ethicist’s bookshelf for some years to come.
650 0 _aPhilosophy (General).
650 0 _aEthics.
650 1 4 _aPhilosophy.
650 2 4 _aEthics.
700 1 _aKirchin, Simon.
_eeditor.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9789048133383
830 0 _aPhilosophical Studies Series ;
_v114
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
999 _c113323
_d113323