000			03561nam a22004815i 4500
001			978-3-642-11434-2
003			DE-He213
005			20140220084530.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			100722s2010 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783642114342 _9978-3-642-11434-2
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-642-11434-2 _2doi
050		4	_aK201-487
050		4	_aB65
050		4	_aK140-165
072		7	_aLAB _2bicssc
072		7	_aLAW079000 _2bisacsh
072		7	_aPHI021000 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a340.1 _223
100	1		_aBenvindo, Juliano Zaiden. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aOn the Limits of Constitutional Adjudication _h[electronic resource] : _bDeconstructing Balancing and Judicial Activism / _cby Juliano Zaiden Benvindo.
264		1	_aBerlin, Heidelberg : _bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg : _bImprint: Springer, _c2010.
300			_aXX, 424p. _bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
505	0		_aGerman and Brazilian Constitutional Cultures: Constitutional Adjudication and Activism -- An Approach to Decision-Making -- Balancing Within the Context of German Constitutionalism: The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s Shift to Activism -- Balancing Within the Context of Brazilian Constitutionalism: The Supremo Tribunal Federal’s Shift to Activism -- The Debate on the Rationality of Balancing -- The Aim to Rationalize Balancing Within the Context of Constitutional Courts’ Activism -- When Différance Comes to Light: Balancing Within the Context of Deconstruction -- When Procedures Towards Mutual Understanding Come to Light: Balancing Within the Context of Proceduralism -- The Concept of Limited Rationality -- Between Différance and Intersubjectivity: The Concept of Limited Rationality in Constitutional Democracy -- Between Différance and Intersubjectivity: The Concept of Limited Rationality in the Realm of Constitutional Adjudication.
520			_aJuliano Z. Benvindo investigates the current movement of constitutional courts towards political activism, especially by focusing on the increasing use of the balancing method as a “rational” justification for this process. From the critical perception of the serious risks of this movement to democracy, the book takes as examples two constitutional realities, Germany and Brazil, in order to discuss the rationality, correctness, and legitimacy of constitutional decisions within this context. Through a dialogue between Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction and Jürgen Habermas’s proceduralism, the author confronts Robert Alexy’s defense of the balancing method as well as those two constitutional realities. This confrontation leads to the introduction of the concept of limited rationality applied to constitutional democracy and constitutional adjudication, which affirms the double bind of history and justice as a condition for a practice of decision-making committed to the principle of separation of powers.
650		0	_aLaw.
650		0	_aPhilosophy of law.
650		0	_aConstitutional law.
650	1	4	_aLaw.
650	2	4	_aTheories of Law, Philosophy of Law, Legal History.
650	2	4	_aConstitutional Law.
650	2	4	_aPhilosophy of Law.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783642114335
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11434-2
912			_aZDB-2-SHU
999			_c111849 _d111849