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001 978-90-481-9609-8
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008 101029s2011 ne | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9789048196098
_9978-90-481-9609-8
024 7 _a10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8
_2doi
050 4 _aB67
072 7 _aPDA
_2bicssc
072 7 _aSCI075000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a501
_223
100 1 _aOlsson, Erik J.
_eeditor.
245 1 0 _aBelief Revision meets Philosophy of Science
_h[electronic resource] /
_cedited by Erik J. Olsson, Sebastian Enqvist.
264 1 _aDordrecht :
_bSpringer Netherlands,
_c2011.
300 _aXX, 359 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aLogic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ;
_v21
505 0 _aEditors’ Introduction -- Raúl Carnota and Ricardo Rodríguez: “AGM Theory and Artificial Intelligence” -- Sven Ove Hansson: “Changing the Scientific Corpus” -- Hans Rott: “Idealization, Intertheory Explanations and Conditionals” -- Gerhard Schurz: “Abductive Belief Revision in Science” -- Sebastian Enqvist: “A Structuralist Framework for the Logic of Theory Change ” -- Peter Gärdenfors and Frank Zenker: “Using Conceptual Spaces to Model the Dynamics -- of Empirical Theories” -- Bengt Hansson: “A Note on Theory Change and Belief Revision” -- Horacio Arlo-Costa and Arthur Paul Pedersen: “Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change” -- David Westlund: “Rational Belief Changes for Collective Agents” -- Emmanuel Genot: “The Best of All Possible Worlds: Where Interrogative Games Meet -- Research Agendas” -- Isaac Levi: “Knowledge as True Belief” -- Caroline Semmling and Heinrich Wansing: “Reasoning about Belief Revision” -- Paul Thagard: “Changing Minds about Climate Change: Belief Revision, Coherence, and -- Emotion” -- Jonas Nilsson and Sten Lindström: “Rationality in Flux: Formal Representations of -- Methodological Change”.
520 _aBelief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes (typically) in the light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references and researchers working in both domains. One may speculate as to what has brought about this surprising, and perhaps unfortunate, state of affairs. One factor may be that while belief revision theory has traditionally been pursued in a bottom- up manner, focusing on the endeavors of single inquirers, philosophers of science, inspired by logical empiricism, have tended to be more interested in science as a multi-agent or agent-independent phenomenon.
650 0 _aPhilosophy (General).
650 0 _aLogic.
650 0 _aScience
_xPhilosophy.
650 1 4 _aPhilosophy.
650 2 4 _aPhilosophy of Science.
650 2 4 _aLogic.
700 1 _aEnqvist, Sebastian.
_eeditor.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9789048196081
830 0 _aLogic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ;
_v21
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
999 _c109049
_d109049