| 000 | 03045nam a22005775i 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | 978-3-642-19763-5 | ||
| 003 | DE-He213 | ||
| 005 | 20140220083758.0 | ||
| 007 | cr nn 008mamaa | ||
| 008 | 110629s2011 gw | s |||| 0|eng d | ||
| 020 |
_a9783642197635 _9978-3-642-19763-5 |
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| 024 | 7 |
_a10.1007/978-3-642-19763-5 _2doi |
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| 050 | 4 | _aHB144 | |
| 072 | 7 |
_aPBUD _2bicssc |
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| 072 | 7 |
_aKCH _2bicssc |
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| 072 | 7 |
_aBUS069000 _2bisacsh |
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| 072 | 7 |
_aMAT011000 _2bisacsh |
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| 082 | 0 | 4 |
_a330.0151 _223 |
| 082 | 0 | 4 |
_a330 _223 |
| 100 | 1 |
_aHorniacek, Milan. _eauthor. |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aCooperation and Efficiency in Markets _h[electronic resource] / _cby Milan Horniacek. |
| 264 | 1 |
_aBerlin, Heidelberg : _bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg : _bImprint: Springer, _c2011. |
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| 300 |
_aVII, 92p. _bonline resource. |
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| 336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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| 338 |
_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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| 347 |
_atext file _bPDF _2rda |
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| 490 | 1 |
_aLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, _x0075-8442 ; _v649 |
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| 505 | 0 | _aIntroduction -- Model -- Existence of an SRPE and an SSPE -- Efficiency of an SRPE and an SSPE -- Afterword. | |
| 520 | _aThe book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms' average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good is produced with the lowest possible costs. If, in addition, all buyers are retailers (i.e., they resell the goods purchased in the analyzed market in a retail market) then the equilibrium vector of the quantities sold in the retail market is sold with the lowest possible selling costs. We specify sufficient conditions under which collusion increases consumer welfare. | ||
| 650 | 0 | _aEconomics. | |
| 650 | 0 | _aMathematics. | |
| 650 | 0 | _aEconomic policy. | |
| 650 | 0 | _aIndustrial organization (Economic theory). | |
| 650 | 0 | _aMicroeconomics. | |
| 650 | 0 | _aEconomics, Mathematical. | |
| 650 | 1 | 4 | _aEconomics/Management Science. |
| 650 | 2 | 4 | _aGame Theory/Mathematical Methods. |
| 650 | 2 | 4 | _aIndustrial Organization. |
| 650 | 2 | 4 | _aEconomic Policy. |
| 650 | 2 | 4 | _aEconomic Theory. |
| 650 | 2 | 4 | _aMicroeconomics. |
| 650 | 2 | 4 | _aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences. |
| 710 | 2 | _aSpringerLink (Online service) | |
| 773 | 0 | _tSpringer eBooks | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9783642197628 |
| 830 | 0 |
_aLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, _x0075-8442 ; _v649 |
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| 856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19763-5 |
| 912 | _aZDB-2-SBE | ||
| 999 |
_c107636 _d107636 |
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