000 03144nam a22005175i 4500
001 978-3-642-03107-6
003 DE-He213
005 20140220083741.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 101112s2011 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783642031076
_9978-3-642-03107-6
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6
_2doi
050 4 _aHB1-846.8
072 7 _aKCA
_2bicssc
072 7 _aBUS069030
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a330.1
_223
100 1 _aGehrlein, William V.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aVoting Paradoxes and Group Coherence
_h[electronic resource] :
_bThe Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules /
_cby William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley.
264 1 _aBerlin, Heidelberg :
_bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2011.
300 _aXII, 385 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aStudies in Choice and Welfare,
_x1614-0311
505 0 _aVoting Paradoxes and Their Probabilities -- Condorcet's Paradox and Group Coherence -- Other Incompability Paradoxes -- Other Voting Paradoxes -- Condorcet Efficiency and Social Homogeneity -- Coherence and the Efficiency Hypothesis -- Other Characteristics of Voting Rules -- The Significance of Voting Rule Selection -- Complete PMR Ranking Efficiencies.
520 _aThe likelihood of observing Condorcet's Paradox is known to be very low for elections with a small number of candidates if voters’ preferences on candidates reflect any significant degree of a number of different measures of mutual coherence. This reinforces the intuitive notion that strange election outcomes should become less likely as voters’ preferences become more mutually coherent. Similar analysis is used here to indicate that this notion is valid for most, but not all, other voting paradoxes. This study also focuses on the Condorcet Criterion, which states that the pairwise majority rule winner should be chosen as the election winner, if one exists. Representations for the Condorcet Efficiency of the most common voting rules are obtained here as a function of various measures of the degree of mutual coherence of voters’ preferences. An analysis of the Condorcet Efficiency representations that are obtained yields strong support for using Borda Rule.
650 0 _aEconomics.
650 0 _aMathematics.
650 0 _aFinance.
650 0 _aEconomics, Mathematical.
650 1 4 _aEconomics/Management Science.
650 2 4 _aEconomic Theory.
650 2 4 _aGame Theory/Mathematical Methods.
650 2 4 _aPublic Finance & Economics.
650 2 4 _aPolitical Science, general.
650 2 4 _aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
700 1 _aLepelley, Dominique.
_eauthor.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783642031069
830 0 _aStudies in Choice and Welfare,
_x1614-0311
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6
912 _aZDB-2-SBE
999 _c106701
_d106701