000 04189nam a22004815i 4500
001 978-1-4419-5809-9
003 DE-He213
005 20140220083720.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 100825s2011 xxu| s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9781441958099
_9978-1-4419-5809-9
024 7 _a10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9
_2doi
050 4 _aJA1-92
072 7 _aJPA
_2bicssc
072 7 _aPOL000000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a320
_223
100 1 _aKönig, Thomas.
_eeditor.
245 1 0 _aReform Processes and Policy Change
_h[electronic resource] :
_bVeto Players and Decision-Making in Modern Democracies /
_cedited by Thomas König, Marc Debus, George Tsebelis.
250 _a1.
264 1 _aNew York, NY :
_bSpringer New York :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2011.
300 _aXII, 284 p.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aStudies in Public Choice,
_x0924-4700 ;
_v16
505 0 _aDynamizing Veto Player Theory: How Veto Player Theory Can be Used as a Starting Point for a More Comprehensive Model of the Policy Process -- Do Veto Players Have Veto Power? -- Veto Player Theory Revisited: Low Policy Reform Capacity in Parliamentary Democracies with Strong Government -- Veto Players: How Can We Measure Their Policy Preferences -- Strategic Voting in a Bicameral Setting -- Who is Powerful in the EU Legislative Process? A New Approach -- The Sources of Bipartisan Politics in Parliamentary Democracies -- Legislative Involvement in Parliamentary Systems: Opportunities, Conflict and Institutional Constraints -- Testing the Theories of Law Making in a Parliamentary Democracy: A Roll Call Analysis of the Italian Chamber of Deputies -- Veto Players and Environmental Regulation: Assessing the Impact of Institutional and Positional Factors for Policy Change in 24 Countries -- Conditional Veto Player Effects in Tax Policy -- Guarding Status Quo or Amplifying Change? Veto-Players and Welfare State Reforms -- The Veto Player Approachy in Comparative Politics: Concepts and Explanatory Power -- Annoying, but Pacifying: Veto Players and the Onset of Civil War -- Veto Players, Bargaining and the Empirical Analysis of EU Policy Making: A Quantal Response Approach -- Mutual Veto?; How Coalitions Work -- Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stability in 17 European Parliaments, 1945-1999.
520 _aGeorge Tsebelis’ veto players approach has become a prominent theory to analyze various research questions in political science. Studies that apply veto player theory deal with the impact of institutions and partisan preferences of legislative activity and policy outcomes. It is used to measure the degree of policy change and, thus, reform capacity in national and international political systems. This volume contains the analysis of leading scholars in the field on these topics and more recent developments regarding theoretical and empirical progress in the area of political reform-making. The contributions come from research areas of political science where veto player theory plays a significant role, including, positive political theory, legislative behavior and legislative decision-making in national and supra-national political systems, policy making and government formation. The contributors to this book add to the current scholarly and public debate on the role of veto players, making it of interest to scholars in political science and policy studies as well as policymakers worldwide.
650 0 _aSocial sciences.
650 0 _aPolitical science
_xPhilosophy.
650 1 4 _aSocial Sciences.
650 2 4 _aPolitical Science, general.
650 2 4 _aPolitical Philosophy.
700 1 _aDebus, Marc.
_eeditor.
700 1 _aTsebelis, George.
_eeditor.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9781441958082
830 0 _aStudies in Public Choice,
_x0924-4700 ;
_v16
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9
912 _aZDB-2-SHU
999 _c105562
_d105562