000			02265nam a22004335i 4500
001			978-3-8349-3527-4
003			DE-He213
005			20140220083333.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			111214s2012 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9783834935274 _9978-3-8349-3527-4
024	7		_a10.1007/978-3-8349-3527-4 _2doi
050		4	_aHB144
050		4	_aQA269-272
072		7	_aPBUD _2bicssc
072		7	_aMAT011000 _2bisacsh
072		7	_aBUS069030 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a519 _223
100	1		_aDuvinage, Cedric. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aReferees in Sports Contests _h[electronic resource] : _bTheir Economic Role and the Problem of Corruption in Professional German Sports Leagues / _cby Cedric Duvinage.
264		1	_aWiesbaden : _bGabler Verlag, _c2012.
300			_aXVI, 161p. 2 illus. _bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
490	1		_aManagement, Organisation und ökonomische Analyse ; _v14
520			_aThe constantly growing number of arising referee corruption cases as well as their damage to the integrity of the sports society raises the question of why sports associations started availing themselves of referees as an instrument of contest design in the first place? Cedric Duvinage shows that economic theory allows to develop a deeper understanding of the role of a referee in a contest as well as of the danger of sports corruption by considering a referee’s influence on the competitors’ strategies in a contest. These insights provide the basis for efficient anti-corruption policies as well as their urgent implementation resulting from the current legal ambiguity regarding the prosecution of sports corruption in Germany.
650		0	_aMathematics.
650	1	4	_aMathematics.
650	2	4	_aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9783834935267
830		0	_aManagement, Organisation und ökonomische Analyse ; _v14
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-3527-4
912			_aZDB-2-SBE
999			_c103984 _d103984