000 03226nam a22004815i 4500
001 978-3-642-30117-9
003 DE-He213
005 20140220083318.0
007 cr nn 008mamaa
008 120516s2012 gw | s |||| 0|eng d
020 _a9783642301179
_9978-3-642-30117-9
024 7 _a10.1007/978-3-642-30117-9
_2doi
050 4 _aQC174.7-175.36
072 7 _aPHS
_2bicssc
072 7 _aPHDT
_2bicssc
072 7 _aSCI055000
_2bisacsh
082 0 4 _a621
_223
100 1 _aPoncela Casasnovas, Julia.
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aEvolutionary Games in Complex Topologies
_h[electronic resource] :
_bInterplay Between Structure and Dynamics /
_cby Julia Poncela Casasnovas.
264 1 _aBerlin, Heidelberg :
_bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg :
_bImprint: Springer,
_c2012.
300 _aXIII, 157 p. 71 illus., 16 illus. in color.
_bonline resource.
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _acomputer
_bc
_2rdamedia
338 _aonline resource
_bcr
_2rdacarrier
347 _atext file
_bPDF
_2rda
490 1 _aSpringer Theses, Recognizing Outstanding Ph.D. Research,
_x2190-5053
505 0 _aSome Basic Concepts on Complex Networks and Games -- The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game on Static Complex Networks -- Other Games on Static Complex Networks -- The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game on Random Scale-Free Networks -- The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game on Scale-Free Networks with Limited Number of Interactions -- Complex Networks from Evolutionary Preferential Attachment -- Complex Networks from Other Dynamic-Dependent Attachment Rules.
520 _aThere are many examples of cooperation in Nature: cells cooperate to form tissues, organs cooperate to form living organisms, and individuals cooperate to raise their offspring or to hunt. However, why cooperation emerges and survives in hostile environments, when defecting would be a much more profitable short-term strategy, is a question that still remains open. During the past few years, several explanations have been proposed, including kin and group selection, punishment and reputation mechanisms, or network reciprocity. This last one will be the center of the present study. The thesis explores the interface between the underlying structure of a given population and the outcome of the cooperative dynamics taking place on top of it, (namely, the Prisoner's Dilemma Game). The first part of this work analyzes the case of a static system, where the pattern of connections is fixed, so it does not evolve over time. The second part develops two models for growing topologies, where the growth and the dynamics are entangled.
650 0 _aPhysics.
650 0 _aBiological models.
650 0 _aMathematics.
650 1 4 _aPhysics.
650 2 4 _aStatistical Physics, Dynamical Systems and Complexity.
650 2 4 _aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
650 2 4 _aSystems Biology.
710 2 _aSpringerLink (Online service)
773 0 _tSpringer eBooks
776 0 8 _iPrinted edition:
_z9783642301162
830 0 _aSpringer Theses, Recognizing Outstanding Ph.D. Research,
_x2190-5053
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30117-9
912 _aZDB-2-PHA
999 _c103129
_d103129