000			04222nam a22005295i 4500
001			978-0-8176-8262-0
003			DE-He213
005			20140220083227.0
007			cr nn 008mamaa
008			111205s2012 xxu| s |||| 0|eng d
020			_a9780817682620 _9978-0-8176-8262-0
024	7		_a10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0 _2doi
050		4	_aHB144
050		4	_aQA269-272
072		7	_aPBUD _2bicssc
072		7	_aMAT011000 _2bisacsh
072		7	_aBUS069030 _2bisacsh
082	0	4	_a519 _223
100	1		_aYeung, David W.K. _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aSubgame Consistent Economic Optimization _h[electronic resource] : _bAn Advanced Cooperative Dynamic Game Analysis / _cby David W.K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan.
250			_a1st Edition.
264		1	_aBoston : _bBirkhäuser Boston, _c2012.
300			_aXVI, 395p. 2 illus. _bonline resource.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia
338			_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier
347			_atext file _bPDF _2rda
490	1		_aStatic & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications
505	0		_aPreface -- Introduction.- 1 Dynamic Strategic Interactions in Economic System.- 2 Dynamic Economic Optimization: Group Optimality and Individual Rationality -- 3 Time Consistency and Optimal-Trajectory-Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization -- 4 Dynamically Stable Cost-saving Joint Venture -- 5 Collaborative Environmental Management -- 6 Dynamically Stable Dormant Firm Cartel -- 7 Subgame Consistent Economic Optimization Under Uncertainty -- 8 Cost-saving Joint Venture Under Uncertainty -- 9 Collaborative Environmental Management Under Uncertainty -- 10 Subgame Consistent Dormant Firm Cartel -- 11 Dynamic Consistency in Discrete-time Cooperative Games -- 12 Discrete-time Cooperative Games Under Uncertainty -- Technical Appendices -- References -- Index.
520			_aThe prevalence of imperfect structures, externalities, and imperfect information in existing market systems prevents the market from serving as an efficient mechanism for resource allocation. In the presence of such failures, optimization of economic activities provides an effective remedial measure. Cooperative optimization suggests the possibility of socially optimal and individually rational solutions to decision problems involving strategic action over time; however, to guarantee that cooperation will last throughout the agreement period, the stringent condition of subgame consistency is required. This textbook presents a treatise on subgame consistent economic optimization, developing game-theoretic optimization techniques to establish the foundation for an effective policy menu to tackle sub-optimal circumstances that the conventional market mechanism fails to resolve. Topics covered include: * dynamic optimization; * group optimality and individual rationality; * time (optimal-trajectory-subgame) consistent economic optimization; * dynamic economic optimization under uncertainty and subgame consistency; * dynamically stable joint ventures; * collaborative environmental management; * discrete-time subgame consistent economic optimization.  This is the first book to thoroughly address the topic of subgame consistent economic optimization. It will be of particular interest as a research reference for game theorists, economists, mathematicians, policy makers, and corporate planners. With ample problems and exercises, it is also a useful text for graduate students in game theory.
650		0	_aMathematics.
650		0	_aMathematical optimization.
650		0	_aEconomics, Mathematical.
650	1	4	_aMathematics.
650	2	4	_aGame Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
650	2	4	_aGame Theory/Mathematical Methods.
650	2	4	_aOptimization.
650	2	4	_aApplications of Mathematics.
700	1		_aPetrosyan, Leon A. _eauthor.
710	2		_aSpringerLink (Online service)
773	0		_tSpringer eBooks
776	0	8	_iPrinted edition: _z9780817682613
830		0	_aStatic & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications
856	4	0	_uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-8262-0
912			_aZDB-2-SMA
999			_c100225 _d100225