Peleg, Bezalel.
Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions / [electronic resource] : by Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters. - XVIII, 154 p. online resource. - Studies in Choice and Welfare, 1614-0311 . - Studies in Choice and Welfare, .
Representations of constitutions -- to Part I -- Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms -- Nash consistent representations -- Acceptable representations -- Strongly consistent representations -- Nash consistent representation through lottery models -- On the continuity of representations of constitutions -- Consistent voting -- to Part II -- Feasible elimination procedures -- Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions -- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters.
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.
9783642138751
10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1 doi
Economics.
Mathematics.
Economics, Mathematical.
Social sciences--Methodology.
Economics/Management Science.
Game Theory/Mathematical Methods.
Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
Economic Theory.
Methodology of the Social Sciences.
HB144
330.0151 330
Strategic Social Choice Stable Representations of Constitutions / [electronic resource] : by Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters. - XVIII, 154 p. online resource. - Studies in Choice and Welfare, 1614-0311 . - Studies in Choice and Welfare, .
Representations of constitutions -- to Part I -- Constitutions, effectivity functions, and game forms -- Nash consistent representations -- Acceptable representations -- Strongly consistent representations -- Nash consistent representation through lottery models -- On the continuity of representations of constitutions -- Consistent voting -- to Part II -- Feasible elimination procedures -- Exactly and strongly consistent representations of effectivity functions -- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters.
This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.
9783642138751
10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1 doi
Economics.
Mathematics.
Economics, Mathematical.
Social sciences--Methodology.
Economics/Management Science.
Game Theory/Mathematical Methods.
Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences.
Economic Theory.
Methodology of the Social Sciences.
HB144
330.0151 330